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APPLICANT TESTING FOR DRUG USE: A POLICY AND
LEGAL INQUIRY
JONATHAN V. HOLTZMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
From the time employer drug testing first became a major
legal and public policy question in the early 1980's, employers
have perceived across-the-board screening of job applicants for
drug use as legally "safe." This perception has become a self-
fulfilling prophecy in the courts,2 yet it runs directly contrary to
the trend toward recognizing limits on the permissible testing of
existing employees. A growing number of courts, legislatures,
and commentators are joining the consensus that privacy con-
cerns require that the testing of incumbent employees be limited
by the dangerousness or sensitivity of the job, or by reasonable
suspicion.3
Although courts have been willing to balance the privacy rights
of existing employees against the interests of employers,4 they
* Special Assistant to the City Attorney for the City and County of San Francisco.
B.A., Haverford College, 1978; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1981. The author wishes to
thank Rodney A. Smolla for his advice and assistance and John Figone for his valuable
research support in the preparation of this Article.
1. The term "applicant testing" is used throughout this Article to describe screening
of job applicants for drug use. It is actually a misnomer. Due largely to cost, employers
do not test job applicants until they tentatively select them for employment. Although
applicants are often given notice that they will be subject to urinalysis at the time they
apply for the job, the test is actually administered as the final step in the employment
process. See A SUBSTANCE ABUSE TESTING ACT S 6(e) task force commentary at 25 (Task
Force on the Drug-Free Workplace, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Proposed Official
Draft 1991) [hereinafter PROPosAL].
2. See Fowler v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation, 704 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1989).
3. Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n v. Washington Township, 850 F2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988)
(authorizing random testing of the entire police force); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power
Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (allowing random testing of employees in nuclear power
plants); Caruso v. Ward, 530 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1989) (allowing random testing of a special
police unit); see Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-1953), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. S
7311 (1988). Nevertheless, employment in a particular kind of job is no guarantee that
testing will be upheld. City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that testing on basis of reasonable suspicion is acceptable, but compulsory
testing without suspicion is unreasonable, see Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark,
524 A.2d 430 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (holding the random testing of police officers
unreasonable).
4. With government workers, the individual's privacy interest is balanced against the
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generally have been unsympathetic to the parallel privacy claims
of applicants. 5
For the most part, the distinction between applicants and
employees in the drug-testing context is based on the view that
job applicants have less to lose than incumbent employees.6 Given
notice that a job for which they have applied requires drug
screening, applicants have a simple choice: either to check their
privacy rights at the door, or to find another door to knock on.7
The distinction between applicants and incumbent employees
is wrong. It conflicts with virtually all major labor legislation
passed since the DepressionS it devalues the right of privacy;
and it is a giant step back to the right-privilege distinction-the
notion that affirmative rights, such as the right of privacy, are
contingent upon property rights, such as the rights that come
with possessing a job
This Article considers the genesis of the distinction between
employees and applicants in the context of drug testing and
critiques the arguments supporting the distinction. It argues that
to the extent our society is willing to recognize the strong,
protected privacy interests that drug testing implicates, privacy
interests should be protected equally for job applicants as well
as incumbents. If privacy rights are already protected-as they
governmental interest. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602 (1989) (upholding postaccident testing of railroad operating employees); McDonnel v.
Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (testing of department of corrections' employees
may not be arbitrary or discriminatory).
5. Although there is clearly a pattern in the cases affording employees greater legal
protection against drug testing than applicants, the law is largely in flux and disarray
as to how much protection employees should receive. See Rodney A. Smolla, Introduction
to PROPOSAL, supra note 1, at 7. As evidence of the current confusion, the pace of judicial
decisions and subsequent reversals is accelerating. See, e.g., Willner v. Thornburgh, 928
F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding applicant-testing program constitutional), petition for
cert. filed sub nom. Willner v. Barr, 60 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Sept. 12, 1991) (No. 91.448);
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir.) (striking down mandatory
urinalysis of fire fighters on department-wide basis when no reasonable suspicion of drug
use existed), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988).
6. See discussion infra part VI.A.2.
7. See Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 204 (Ct. App. 1989) ("Simply
put, applicants . . . have a choice, they may consent to the limited invasion of their
privacy ... or may decline both the test and the conditional offer of employment.").
8. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, S 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(3) (1988) (extending
protection to applicants as well as employees).
9. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69 (1982)
(identifying the entitlement doctrine in procedural due process analysis as a modern
manifestation of the right-privilege distinction); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of
the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968) (arguing
that Justice Holmes' concept of privilege is no longer viable).
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are under the United States Constitution and the constitutions
of many states-the courts should interpret those privacy pro-
tections to apply equally to employees and applicants. If no
privacy protections exist and the legislatures consider enacting
them, the protections for applicants and employees should be the
same.
The right of privacy is comparatively new and undefined. 10
Congress has yet to enact any comprehensive scheme that rec-
ognizes and protects private sector employees' expectations of
privacy against infringement by their employers.,, Privacy has
yet to be accorded the level of protection given to other "affir-
mative rights" affecting employees and job applicants, such as
the right to be free from discrimination, the right to a minimum
wage, and the right to engage in collective bargaining. 2 Changes
in technology give both government and private sector employers
a greater technical capacity to invade privacy. Given the strength
of the basic American belief that individuals have a "right to be
let alone,"' 3 and given our revulsion to the image of men and
women governed by machines-whether in the novel 1984 or in
the film 2001: A Space Odyssey-inevitably the protection of the
privacy of "the average man or woman" will eventually graduate
to first-class status as a protected interest in American law.
10. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (outlining the consti-
tutional right of privacy); White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 232-35 (Cal. 1975) (discussing the
right to privacy provided by the California Constitution).
11. The Fourth Amendment, which provides the broadest protections, applies only to
state action. Despite the heavy involvement of the federal government in encouraging
private employers to use drug testing, Fourth Amendment challenges to drug testing
have generally been limited to government workers. See Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger,
818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Bostic v. MeClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245 (NJ). Ga. 1986).
A few states-most notably California-have filled this "privacy" gap. Article I, S 1 of
the California Constitution ensures the right of privacy of all California residents against
intrusion both by government and private actors. CAL. CONST. art. I, S 1. Other states
and cities have enacted legislation specifically addressing drug testing, but most private
sector employees-whether incumbents or applicants-have virtually no protection against
unwarranted invasions of privacy. For that reason, private sector employers in most
states have little to fear in across-the-board testing of employees, much less applicants.
12. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that a firm may not
make partnership decisions on the basis of sex); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (granting employees the right to bring action in federal
district court under the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (holding that employer could not
prohibit employees from organizing). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(refusing to extend the right of privacy).
13. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890).
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In the short term, however, significant threats to the right of
privacy in the employment area are taking hold and gaining
ground. These threats include integrity testing, psychological
testing,14 genetic testing, intelligence testing, pupillary reaction
testing, and a variety of "surveillance" techniques. 16
The distinctions established with respect to drug testing will
have a lasting impact on the evolution and vitality of the right
of privacy. We should ask ourselves the fundamental question
now: should the protection of the right of privacy really turn on
whether a person is fortunate enough to hold a job?
II. THE DISTINCTION AND ITS JUSTIFICATIONS
In the few years since the development of the enzyme multi-
plied immunoassay technique (EMIT) test and the enormous pro-
liferation of preemployment drug-screening programs, the
distinction between the rights of applicants and incumbent em-
ployees has become remarkably well entrenched. 16 A number of
legislatures have codified the distinction. 17
14. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) (upholding employers' rights
regarding psychological aptitude tests).
15. See Charles B. Craver, The Inquisitorial Process in Private Employment, 63 CORNELL
L. REV. 1 (1977) (arguing that surreptitious surveillance techniques invade workers'
privacy).
16. See, e.g., Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 630 n.14 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 344 (1990); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194
(Ct. App. 1989); KURT H. DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE 300 (1987)
("Employers have greater latitude with job applicants than with present employees.");
IRA MICHAEL SHEPARD ET AL., WORKPLACE PRIVACY: EMPLOYEE TESTING, SURVEILLANCE,
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND OTHER AREAS OF VULNERABILITY 78 (1989) ("Testing of job
applicants for substance abuse poses fewer problems than testing employees. No serious
legal challenge to the right of private employers to test applicants for drugs has been
decided by the courts."). See generally ROBERT P. DECRESCE ET AL., DRUG TESTING IN THE
WORKPLACE 10 (1989) ("When drug testing is confined to job applicants, as opposed to
current employees, employers face fewer legal challenges:'); 3 M. KIRBY WILCOX, CALI-
FORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAW S 50.43[I][a][ii] (1990) (commenting on Wilkinson).
17. Laurel A. Mousseau & Ellen Raim, Drug Testing in the Private Sector: Current
State of the Law, 4 EMPLOYMENT TESTING 681 (1990). Seventeen states have drug testing
statutes: California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Utah, and Vermont. Id. at 685. In addition, five municipalities have passed drug testing
laws: Atlanta, Berkeley, Boulder, Houston, and San Francisco. Id. Although most of these
statutes and ordinances also regulate preemployment testing, a majority do not signifi-
cantly limit an employer's ability to test all applicants, subject to meeting certain
procedural requirements. Notably, two of the more restrictive laws, those of Atlanta and
San Francisco, limit employee testing to "reasonable grounds," but do not regulate
applicant testing. Id On the other hand, Houston and Montana limit employee and
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Generally, the justifications for the distinction between the
rights of applicants and incumbent employees fall into three
categories. The primary justification rests on the theory that
because applicants have notice that a particular job will require
urinalysis, they are free simply not to apply.18 Presumably, ap-
plicants differ from employees in this regard because applicants
arguably have less invested in any particular prospective job
than incumbent employees. By contrast, incumbent employees
may have a substantial investment in and reliance on their
current job. Particularly after having worked at a job for a period
of time, they may have mortgages, car payments, and other
obligations.
The precise relevance of the notion that applicants have less
invested in a particular job is unclear. Some courts and commen-
tators have suggested that the lesser interest means that the
applicants' privacy interest is more easily outweighed by the
employer's interest in safety, productivity, or another justifica-
tion for drug testing.19 Others have suggested that the privacy
interest itself is lessened because the applicants receive notice.20
A variant of this argument is that employers have greater
latitude to demand that prospective employees waive their pri-
vacy rights as a condition of employment. Few would argue that
an employer could demand that an incumbent employee who did
not have notice that urinalysis would be a condition of her
employment had freely waived her privacy rights when faced
with the choice of submitting to the test or losing her job. The
argument, however, has greater force for applicants. Assuming
employers provide adequate notice-and notice appears to be an
irreducible minimum that both courts and legislatures have re-
quired to uphold drug testing21-one may argue that, by applying
applicant testing to certain sensitive or dangerous jobs. Id
The Institute of Bill of Rights Law Task Force on the Drug-Free Workplace divided
evenly on the issue of preemployment testing, and it finally offered two alternative
legislative solutions: one allowed applicant testing, while the other prohibited applicant
testing except in situations in which testing would be permitted for employers in that
job category. See PROPOSAL, supra note 1, at 24.
18. See Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (construing article I, S 1 of the California
Constitution, which applies equally to actions by government, business, and private actors).
For a discussion of Wilkinson, see infra notes 160-72 and accompanying text.
19. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (holding
that public safety and national security concerns justify testing of customs agents applying
for promotion to certain positions).
20. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
21. Notice, however, may be deemed inherent if one is in a "regulated" industry. See
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (railroad operating
employees); Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (customs agents).
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for the job, the applicants implicitly accept that drug testing is
a requirement.22 The applicants are free to choose not to have
their privacy invaded; they may walk away.m Viewed in this
light, drug testing differs little from any condition of employment
that employers may choose to impose, such as a requirement that
employees be available to work overtime or submit to a preem-
ployment physical.
A second category of argument supporting the distinction
between applicants and employees is that the employers' interest
in testing applicants-especially applicants for dangerous or sen-
sitive jobs-is greater than for testing incumbent employees.24
Employers may observe the work performance and conduct of
incumbent employees. They therefore have less intrusive ways
of determining whether an employee has a drug problem. Alter-
natively, employers may not even need to make this determina-
tion; they may dismiss employees for poor work performance.
Of course, employers have the same ability to assess the
performance of job applicants after they hire the applicants, but
employers have much to lose by hiring employees with drug
problems. Absenteeism, tardiness, poor morale, poor productivity,
disruptiveness, mistakes, poor judgment, accidents, workers' com-
pensation claims, and other problems are frequently linked to
drug use.2 These problems may cost employers money and dam-
age the morale of other employees even if the job is not danger-
ous or sensitive. Before they can dismiss the employee, employers
may be required by law or contractual arrangement to permit
or even to pay for drug rehabilitation.26 In addition, firing em-
ployees takes time and resources, and, in the postwrongful dis-
charge world, requires documentation and progressive discipline.
Testing incumbent employees for drug use risks lawsuits,27 and
22. See Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
23. The Article refers to this argument as the "noticelwaiver" argument.
24. The Article refers to this argument as the "employer's interest" argument.
25. Mark J. Barnes et al., A Question of America's Future: Drug-Free or Not?, 36 KAN.
L. REv. 699, 705-06 (1988).
26. Courts have supported the removal of federal employees in positions involving
public health, safety, law enforcement, and national security due to off-duty drug use. Id.
at 742 n.228. Some states, however, forbid discharge unless the employee refuses to
undergo treatment. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, S 513(cX3) (1987).
27. See Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (allowing plaintiff to recover damages when employer falsely stated that plaintiff
was fired for drug abuse). An employer may conduct an internal investigation, however,
without being liable for defamation. Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 768 F.2d 703 (5th Cir.
1985).
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accusing employees of drug use without sufficient evidence vir-
tually assures lawsuits. Finally, even after employees are dis-
missed, the cost of the employers' unemployment insurance
premiums may be increased. For these reasons, employers argue
that their interest in preemployment screening is higher.
Finally, a central underlying rationale for across-the-board ap-
plicant testing is that private employers are furthering the "war
on drugs" by using the workplace as a "choke hold." Across-the-
board screening of applicants makes it more difficult for drug
users to get jobs and therefore deters drug use.
Both of the previous arguments favoring across-the-board ap-
plicant testing-the notice/waiver argument and the enhanced
employer's interest argument-are legally more palatable than
this final rationae.28 However, it is difficult to ignore the fact
that the final rationale may well be the true reason underlying
many, if not most, across-the-board applicant testing programs.
III. THE APPLICANT-EMPLOYEE DISTINCTION IN OTHER
CONTEXTS
A. From Lochner to Loudermill
The distinction between applicants and incumbent employees
has its historical roots in the "Lochner '29 era-from about the
turn of the century until the mid-1930's. During this era, the
Supreme Court struck down a wide variety of labor legislation
by claiming that the legislation impaired freedom to contract.30
Among the legislation invalidated were minimum wage laws,31
28. Even the government appears to avoid this argument in court. Nevertheless, at
least one federal district court has adopted the argument. In Jevic v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 5 Individual Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 765 (D.N.J. 1990), a federal district court judge
noted, in considering a private employer's across-the-board preemployment drug screening
program:
IThe Court finds nothing offensive in the subject procedure, either to the
law or principles of public policy .... The Court notes that illegal drugs
exact an enormous toll on the health and continued economic vitality of this
nation. The Government has in fact declared a war on drugs and is vigorously
prosecuting all drug offensives [sic]. The Court does not accept plaintiff's
invitation to shield their use by creating amorphous legal rights. On the
contrary, it sanctions the efforts of the private sector to combat drug
use ....
Id. at 766.
29. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (emphasizing the liberty to contract
between an employer and employee).
30. See KERuIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 23845 (1989).
31. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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laws prohibiting "yellow dog contracts" which required workers
to refrain from union membership as a condition of employment,32
laws establishing maximum working hours,33 and other similar
legislation.?4
Although the holdings in these cases did not distinguish ex-
pressly between applicants and employees, they were based on
the central underlying thesis of the distinction: employers should
be free to demand a waiver of substantive rights as a condition
of employment. 5 The conclusions reached in the Lochner-era cases
also share a central fault: they ignore the imbalance in the
bargaining relationship between employers and employees and
the limited "freedom" many applicants may have to make choices.3e
Both are based on what Professor Laurence Tribe refers to as a
"misguided understanding of what liberty actually require[s] in
the industrial age."s1
By 1937, the Lochner model had collapsed.s One of the most
notable advances in the post-Lochner era has been the develop-
ment of a set of "substantive" constitutional and statutory rights
32. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908).
33. See Lochner, 198 U.S. 45. But see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding
state legislation regulating the number of hours women could work).
34. See Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522 (1923) (striking
down state laws requiring compulsory arbitration for private businesses).
35. This thesis is described by Professor Tribe's summary of Justice Pitney's opinion
in Coppage v. Kansas:
Restriction of freedom to contract for personal employment, he explained,
was a "substantial impairment of liberty" which was "as essential to the
laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich," since only by
bartering their employment could poor laborers begin to acquire property.
The right to join a union was a right that a worker should be able to bargain
away if it was to his or her advantage. Liberty of contract could be
incidentally impaired by statutes in the aid of the general public welfare
... but not to redress so-called inequalities of bargaining power, which were
"but the normal and inevitable result" of the exercise of the right to contract
itself.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 572 (2d ed. 1988) (citations omitted).
The Lochner-style approach to regulation of labor did not go uncriticized at the time.
Justices Harlan, White, Day, and Holmes were vigorous dissenters in Lochner. See Lochner,
198 U.S. at 65 (Harlan, White, and Day, JJ., dissenting); id. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Learned Hand was also a fierce critic. See Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the
Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. Ruv. 495 (1908).
36. See HALL, supra note 30, at 241-43.
37. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 769.
38. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (expressing the
Supreme Court's deference to legislative economic judgment); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining constitutionality of Washington's minimum wage
law for women).
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that are not dependent on contract, such as the right to be free
from discrimination and retaliation and rights of accommodation,
collective bargaining, minimum wage, and privacy.39
A second major development in labor law in the post-Lochner
era is the development of "new property"-the notion that gov-
ernment employees have a property right in continued employ-
ment when state law has placed limitations on their dismissal. 0
Such employees are entitled to procedural due process before
they may be dismissed.41 Although the "property right" analysis
has been confined to the public sector, as a practical matter, the
rise of "wrongful discharge" litigation in the private sector has
essentially followed the approach of the procedural due process
cases-extending protections against dismissals without cause
based on the employer's policies and longevity of employment. 42
Strikingly, these models of substantive and procedural rights
lead in opposite directions for the purposes of our current in-
quiry.4 The substantive rights model generally does not distin-
guish between applicants and employees, and, with very few
exceptions, substantive rights cannot be waived as a condition
of employment. On the other hand,' the procedural rights model
generally is applied only to incumbent employees, because only
39. For the purposes of this Article, such rights will be referred to as "substantive
rights." Substantive rights are directed toward a specific activity which either the
employees and applicants have a right to engage in, or the employers are prohibited
from engaging in. Such rights are recognized, for example, in major labor and civil rights
acts. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 151-169 (1988); Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988).
40. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
41. Id. at 751-52.
42. The distinction between substantive and procedural rights is crude. Undeniably,
there is a substantive component to procedural due process, for it recognizes the
substantive right of employees to be free from arbitrary treatment. See, e.g., Pugh v.
See's Candies, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922 n.11 (Ct. App. 1981) (requiring notice and hearing
before denying claimant's substantive rights). A clear majority of jurisdictions have
modified or created exceptions to the terminable-at-will principle. See William B. Gould
IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective
Bargaining Framework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 885, 887 n.6. Of course, the rights of private
sector employees remain far more limited than the rights of public sector employees.
The terminable-at-will rule remains the norm in private sector employment. See Garcia
v. Aetna Fin. Co., 752 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1984); Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156
(4th Cir. 1982); Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1981).
43. This is particularly striking because commentators have generally viewed the
substantive rights model-and particularly the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions"-
as a precursor to the elimination of the right-privilege distinction and the "new property"
cases as the achievement of that goal. See Rodney A. Smolla, Preserving the Bill of Rights
in the Modern Administrative-Industrial State, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 321 (1990).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 52-73.
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they may develop a "property interest" in their employment.45
Procedural rights are thus conceptualized as creatures of the
"rules and understandings" 46 created by the employer. They are
usually understood as part of the "job package" accepted by the
employee under hire. A private employer is thus free to condition
employment on an express agreement that the employee is ter-
minable at will,47 and a public employer is free not to create a
property interest at all, by simply not creating the expectations
that limit dismissal to just cause.
In all likelihood, this latter model of procedural rights has
given rise to the notion that the rights of applicants and incum-
bent employees differ significantly with respect to drug testing.
Ironically, the growth of these protections against discharge has
also encouraged employers to screen employees aggressively
before hiring.49
45. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972) (stating that "[tihe
Fourteenth Amendments procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security
interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits."); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972) (applying property rights to those who have clear "entitlement
to continued employment" (emphasis added)); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 539 (1985) (holding that a state statute clearly gave employees a property
right in continued employment); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (denying that inmates have a property interest in obtaining
early parole). But ef. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (holding that for cause firing of
police officer did not violate officer's due process rights). See generally Michael J. Higgins,
Comment, California Wrontfl Discharge Law and the Public Employee, 23 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 117 (1989) (describing remedies available to public employees claiming wrongful
discharge).
46. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602.
47. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
48. Roth, 408 U.S. at 567 & n.4; TRnBE, supra note 35, at 686; Smolla, supra note 43, at
361-62; Higgins, supra note 45, at 122.
Although commentators have criticized the decision of the courts to distinguish between
those employees who have already acquired rights and those who are applying for those
rights, see, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 35, at 690 nn.36-37, in the employment procedural due
process context, the distinction makes a certain amount of sense. Unlike the substantive
rights cases, which prohibit or protect specific conduct, the due process/wrongful discharge
cases protect against a far broader category of mischief-arbitrariness. If the cases
extended beyond situations in which the employer had agreed not to act in an arbitrary
manner, the entire doctrine of employment-at-wili would be eliminated, and every hiring
decision would be subject to judicial scrutiny. Although commentators have described
the employment-at-will doctrine as anachronistic, see Gregory A. Naylor, Employment at
Will: The Decay of an Anachronistic Shield for Employers?, 33 DRAKE L. REv. 113 (1983),
no court or legislature has been willing to eliminate all at-will employment, even in the
public sector. Additionally, no one even suggests that absent a proscribed basis of decision
such as discrimination, employers have a broad legal obligation to justify their selection
of one applicant for employment over another.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
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Although the distinction between applicants and employees is
based on the procedural due process/wrongful discharge model,
the right of privacy is a substantive right. As discussed below,
substantive rights generally are not dependent on the existence
of "property interests" and do not distinguish between employees
and applicants.5 Employers are generally not free to demand the
waiver of such rights as a condition of employment.5'
B. Substantive Rights
1. Public Employees and Unconstitutional Conditions
Many of the substantive rights of public employees stem di-
rectly from the Constitution.5 In this admittedly limited context,
courts have rejected the notion that because the government is
under no obligation to hire an applicant, employment may be
made contingent on the waiver of a constitutional right.P This is
generally referred to as the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions.r4
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been applied to
applicants for employment in numerous contexts. In Torcaso v.
Watkins,5 for example, the Supreme Court held that the State
of Maryland could not refuse a commission for notary public on
the ground that the applicant refused to declare his belief in
God.e The State argued, in terms eerily foreshadowing the ar-
guments made by the proponents of across-the-board applicant
testing, "The petitioner is not compelled to believe or disbelieve,
under threat of punishment or other compulsion. True, unless he
makes the declaration of belief he cannot hold public office in
Maryland, but he is not compelled to hold office."M
50. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 52-73.
52. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X, XIV.
53. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (preventing a sheriff from firing employees
because of their political affiliation).
54. Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 1447-49 (addressing the unconstitutionality of condi-
tions when recognized constitutional rights are at stake).
55. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
56. Id-
57. Id. at 495 (quoting Torcaso v. Watkins, 162 A.2d 438, 442 (Md. 1960)). Similarly, in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), the Court struck down a state law
prohibiting the employment of members of various "subversive" organizations, including
the Communist party. The Court quoted with approval the Second Circuit's observation
that, " 'the theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be
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The clearest application of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions to job applicants came in a case decided by the Su-
preme Court only last Term, Rutan v. Republican Party.58 Rutan
expressly held that the protections against discharge on the basis
of political patronage announced in Elrod v. Burnss9 and Branti
v. Finkel60 extend to job applicants. In doing so, it reversed the
Seventh Circuit's conclusion that hiring decisions based on pa-
tronage were permissible because "'rejecting an employment
application does not impose a hardship upon an employee com-
parable to the loss of [a] job.' "161
The Court rejected the central basis of the Seventh Circuit's
decision-that "only those employment decisions that are the
'substantial equivalent of a dismissal' violate a public employee's
rights under the first amendment" - because it "fail[ed] to rec-
ognize that there are deprivations less harsh than dismissal that
nevertheless press state employees and applicants to conform
subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly re-
jected."' Id. at 605-06 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir.
1965)). It also expressly disapproved of an earlier case, Adler v. Board of Education, 342
U.S. 485 (1952), which had sustained the constitutionality of the law. Keyhian, 385 U.S.
at 595. The Court quoted at length the "major premise" of Adler, which also bears an
uncanny resemblance to the arguments made in favor of across-the-board applicant testing.
Teachers, the Court said in Adler, "may work for the school system upon
the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities. . . . If they do
not choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs
and associations and go elsewhere." The Court also stated that a teacher
denied employment because of membership in a listed organization "is not
thereby denied the right of free speech and assembly. His freedom of choice
between membership in the organization and employment in the school
system might be limited, but not his freedom of speech or assembly, except
in the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every choice."
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605 (citations omitted) (quoting Adler, 342 U.S. at 492, 493); see
also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (striking down loyalty oath that was
prerequisite to public employment).
58. 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
59. 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (holding that employees threatened with discharge because of
their partisan affiliation or nonaffiliation have a claim under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments).
60. 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect
employees from discharge based on their political beliefs).
61. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2739 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party, 868 F.2d 943, 954
(7th Cir. 1989)). The Seventh Circuit was not the only circuit to reach a similar conclusion.
See, e.g., Lieberman v. Reisman, 857 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that an unfavorable
action taken against an employee because of her political affiliation may be the basis of
a claim under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1982)); Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1987)
(allowing "discipline" based on political affiliation); DeLong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618
(4th Cir. 1980) (holding similar to that of the Seventh Circuit).
APPLICANT TESTING FOR DRUG USE
their beliefs and associations to some state-selected orthodoxy. 62
As Justice Brennan explained:
A state job is valuable. Like most employment, it provides
regular paychecks, health insurance, and other benefits. In
addition, there may be openings with the State when business
in the private sector is slow. There are also occupations for
which the government is a major (or the only) source of
employment, such as social workers, elementary school teach-
ers, and prison guards. Thus, denial of a state job is a serious
privation.P
Rutan provides strong support for the notion that applicants and
employees should be treated the same with respect to drug
testing.
On the opposite side of the coin, however, is Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education." In Wygant, the Supreme Court held that a
provision of a collective-bargaining agreement designed to protect
the effects of an affirmative action hiring policy violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.65 The provision had the effect of pro-
tecting some minority -teachers from layoff while more senior
nonminority teachers were laid off." In the course of its discus-
sion, the plurality in Wygant was forced to distinguish cases in
which the Court had approved affirmative action hiring plans, in
particular, Steelworkers v. Weber.67 The Court observed:
Significantly, none of the cases discussed above involved lay-
offs .... We have previously expressed concern over the
burden that a preferential-layoffs scheme imposes on innocent
parties .... In cases involving valid hiring goals, the burden
to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a considerable
62. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2737.
63. Id. at 2738. Drawing a distinction between procedural due process and the issues
at stake in Rutan, the Court noted that "[t]he First Amendment is not a tenure provision,
protecting public employees from actual or constructive discharge. The First Amendment
prevents the government, except in the most compelling circumstances, from wielding
its power to interfere with its employees' freedom to believe and associate, or not to
believe and not associate." Id. at 2737-38. The Court also rejected the concern that
extending Elrod and Branti to applicants "would open state employment to excessive
interference by the federal judiciary." Id. at 2737 n.8.
64. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
65. Id. at 283-84.
66. Id. at 271.
67. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). As the plurality in Wygant noted, Weber involved a private
affirmative action plan, and therefore was based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, rather than equal protection. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282 n.9.
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extent among society generally. Though hiring goals may bur-
den some innocent individuals, they simply do not impose the
same kind of injury that layoffs impose. Denial of a future
employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an
existing job.P
The Court went on to discuss the significance of employees'
expectations regarding seniority, concluding that "[w]hile hiring
goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of
several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achiev-
ing racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in
serious disruption of their lives."6 9
Whether Rutan or Wygant is more closely analogous to the
preemployment drug-testing context is a complex question. In
Rutan, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the Seventh Cir-
cuit's reliance on Wygant as a basis for distinguishing patronage
hiring from dismissal based on patronage. 70 The Court reasoned
that the plurality in Wygant was concerned with "identifying the
least harsh means of remedying past wrongs.7
By contrast, in Rutan, the Constitution flatly prohibited the
conduct engaged in by the government. The Court thus observed:
It is unnecessary here to consider whether not being hired is
less burdensome than being discharged because the govern-
ment is not pressed to do either on the basis of political
affiliation. The question in the patronage context is not which
penalty is more acute but whether the government, without
sufficient justification, is pressuring employees to discontinue
the free exercise of their First Amendment rights.72
The discussion in Rutan suggests a major distinction between
drug testing and the logic used in Wygant. In Wygant, the Court
addressed the conflict of two compelling interests-the need to
remedy past discrimination and the prohibitions on discrimination
against nonminorities -both arising under the Equal Protection
Clause. In this respect, Wygant is unique, for it deals with the
distinction between employees and applicants when two substan-
tive rights conflict. In that limited context, the Court held quite
68. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83.
69. Id. at 283.
70. Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (1990).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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logically that current employees enjoy greater protection of their
rights than applicants. When it comes to across-the-board applicant
testing, however, privacy is the only compelling interest impli-
cated. Employers cannot claim a similarly compelling interest.73
2. Private Employees-Statutory Rights
The cases discussed in the previous section pertain exclusively
to public sector employees and applicants. Although the logic of
these cases and statutes is not limited to the public sector, the
question remains whether the rights of private sector employees
and applicants should be analyzed differently.74
Most federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination pro-
tect the substantive rights of both applicants and employees.75
With very minor exceptions, courts and lawmakers have rejected
suggestions that these protections may be waived as a condition
of employment.76 Those few statutes that treat applicants and
employees differently usually do so because they address issues
that can arise only after employment.77 Even those statutes
generally extend protections to applicants in all situations in
which an employer might discriminate against the applicant based
on the exercise of rights under the statute.7
Not surprisingly, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)79
does not cover applicants, because it deals with pay for current
employees. However, the central minimum wage and overtime
provisions cannot traditionally be waived as a condition of em-
73. This Article does not suggest that when a compelling interest is present, the
employer should be prohibited from testing. The issue with respect to across-the-board
testing arises because, unless the entire workforce of an employer is engaged in hazardous
or otherwise sensitive duties, by definition there is not a compelling interest.
74. Significantly, at least one California court has already refused to apply the logic
underlying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to private employers in the drug-
testing context, despite the fact that the right of privacy is in the California Constitution
and applies directly to private actors. See Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr.
194 (Ct. App. 1989).
75. See infra notes 82-88, 92-94 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302
(1985); see also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 151-169 (1988); Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §S 621-634 (1988); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
SS 2000a to 2O00h-6 (1988); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12,101-12,213
(West Supp. 1991).
77. See infra note 80-81 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
79. 29 U.S.C.S. S 201-219 (Law. Co-op. 1975 & Supp. 1991).
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ployment or otherwise.80 These protections apply even when
employees knowingly and voluntarily seek to decline the FLSA
protections."'
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)82 also seems to deal
primarily with the rights of incumbent employees.P In Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,84 however, the Supreme Court held that
an employer violated Section 8(3) of the Act s by refusing to hire
job applicants who were union members.8 The NLRB and courts
subsequently have held that the broad definition of "employee"
contained in Section 2(3) protects members of the working class
generally.8 7 The Eighth Circuit held, "[a]n applicant is. . .treated
as an employee within the meaning of [Section 2(3)] of the Act
defining an employee and [Section 8(3)] proscrib[ing] 'discrimina-
tion in regard to hire.' ,,8
Certain rights have been held subject to waiver in the context
of a collective-bargaining agreement. 9 At least until recently,
however, courts have limited such bargained waivers to situations
in which the nature of the right protected by statute is primarily
a "collective" as opposed to "individual" right.90
80. See, e.g., Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1981); D.A.
Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114-16 (1946); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S.
697, 706-07 (1945); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 42 (1944).
81. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 302. See generally H.R. REP. No. 221, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 5-6 (1989) (relating congressional and judicial reasoning for the nonwaivable nature
of FLSA rights and explaining qualifications to nonwaivability).
82. 29 U.S.C. SS 151-169 (1988).
83. See generally 29 U.S.C. S 151 (stating the policy of the NLRA). The NLRA focuses
on the right of employees to organize.
84. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
85. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(3)).
86. Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 185.
87. 49 Stat. 449, 450 (codified at 29 U.S.C. S 152(a)); see, e.g., Reliance Ins. Cos. v.
NLRB, 415 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1969); Giant Food Mkts. Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 727 (1979).
88. Reliance Ins., 415 F.2d at 6 (citing Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 191-93). Similar
protection is provided expressly in the Federal Labor-Management and Employee Rela-
tions Act, 5 U.S.C. SS 7101-7135 (1988). See Nelson v. Piedmont Aviation, 750 F.2d 1234,
1236-37 (4th Cir. 1984). Notably, the definition of "employee" in the Railway Labor Act,
45 U.S.C. §5 151-188 (1988), does not cover applicants. See id. S 151. Section 2(3) of the
NLRA, however, specifically excludes employees subject to the Railway Labor Act-
therefore, if not covered by Railway Act, employees fall under the NLRA.
89. See, e.g., Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that certain
rights under 5 7 of the NLRA, such as the right to engage in strikes during the contract
term, may be waived in a collective-bargaining agreement).
90. In the leading case on point, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974),
the Supreme Court held that rights granted to employees as individuals under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may not be waived through collective bargaining. Id. at
51-52. Distinguishing cases in which the Court permitted waivers of statutory rights
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For the most part, the above statutes were passed and inter-
preted in an era more favorable to employees' substantive rights.
For this reason, Congress' recent passage of the Employee Pol-
ygraph Protection Act of 1988 (Polygraph ActP1 is particularly
notable.
By its terms, the Polygraph Act applies to both applicants and
employees, and states that it is intended "to prevent the denial
of employment opportunities by prohibiting the use of lie detectors
through collective bargaining, the Court observed:
[Statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the right to strike
... are conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of
bargaining and properly may be exercised or relinquished by the union as
collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for union members.
Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it concerns
not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment
opportunities.
Id.
The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981), regarding the minimum wage guarantees of FLSA. Id.
at 739-41. There the Court observed:
In contrast to the Labor Management Relations Act, which was designed to
minimize industrial strife and to improve working conditions by encouraging
employees to promote their interests collectively, the FLSA was designed to
give specific minimum protections to individual workers and to ensure that
each employee covered by the Act would receive "'[a] fair day's pay for a
fair day's work'" ....
Id. at 739.
In a similar vein, courts have concluded that certain rights under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. SS 621-634 (1988), cannot be waived through
collective bargaining. Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 227-28 (3d Cir. 1989);
EEOC v. County of Calumet, 686 F.2d 1249, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1982). But see Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (employee may waive judicial forum
of ADEA claim in employment application).
Disturbingly, however, at least two recent decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have held that under S 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 141-197 (1988), collective-bargaining agreements may preempt
the right of privacy provided by state law. Stikes v. Chevron USA, Inc., 914 F.2d 1265,
1268 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2015 (1991); Utility Workers Local No. 246 v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078
(1989). In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the notion that
"the California right to privacy is not negotiable and cannot be affected by a collective
bargaining agreement." Stikes, 914 F.2d at 1270.
These cases suggest an ominous trend toward the erosion of the privacy rights of
incumbent employees. Significantly, however, they involve the waiver of rights through
a collective-bargaining process. In.this respect, they bear little similarity to the issue
here-the waiver of rights by individual applicants as a condition of employment. In a
collective-bargaining context, far greater equality of bargaining power exists. Even so, it
is difficult to escape the irony that, if this trend continues, unionized employees will have
significantly fewer rights than their unorganized counterparts.
91. 29 U.S.C. SS 2001-2009 (1988).
92. Id. S 2001(2) ("The term 'employer' includes any person acting ... in the interest
of an employer in relation to an employee or prospective employee.").
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by employers involved in or affecting interstate commerce."93 The
House Report on the Act indicates that a particular target of
the Polygraph Act was preemployment screening which, the
report indicates, was the most common use of lie detector tests
in industry.9 4
The Polygraph Act's inclusion of applicants is particularly
significant for two reasons. First, as with drug testing, one of
the primary concerns regarding the use of lie detectors in em-
ployment is the invasion of privacy.95 Numerous commentators9
and the California Supreme Court9 have analyzed the privacy
implications of lie detectors. Although Congress' primary moti-
vation for enacting the Polygraph Act was undeniably the inac-
curacy of lie detectors, were it not for the intrusiveness of lie
detectors, it seems unlikely Congress would have acted to bar
virtually all uses of lie detectors in employment.
Second, most of the arguments made for distinguishing pre-
employment and postemployment use of drug testing apply equally
to the use of lie detectors. After notification that a lie detector
test is a condition of employment, prospective employees are free
to apply elsewhere. Moreover, employers have argued that ban-
ning lie detector use will inhibit their ability to ferret out dis-
honest employees98 and will result in the loss of billions of
dollars.99
The Polygraph Act is also notable for its very stringent pro-
hibitions on waiver. The Act generally prohibits employers from
even suggesting that employees or prospective employees submit
93. H.R. REP. No. 208, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987) (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 3-4.
95. See id. at 8 ("These tests, used by employers in pre-employment and random on-
the-job screening, are not used just to detect deception, but are often used to gain
personal information about applicants' thoughts and attitudes.").
96. See, e.g., Lee M. Burkey, Privacy, Property and the Polygraph, 18 LAB. L.J. 79
(1967); Charles B. Craver, The Inquisitorial Process in Private Employment, 63 CORNELL
L. REv. 1 (1977); Paul Falick, Lie Detectors and the Right to Privacy, 40 N.Y. ST. B.J. 102
(1968); Donald H. J. Hermann III, Privacy, the Prospective Employee, and Employment
Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REV. 73
(1971); Armondo M. Menocal III & James McDonald Williams, Editorial Note, Lie Detectors
in Private Employment: A Proposal for Balancing Interests, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 932
(1965).
97. See Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 663-66
(Cal. 1986).
98. See H.R. REP. No. 208, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1987) (minority views of Reps.
Steve Bartlett, Dick Armey, Harris W. Fawell, and Cass Ballenger).
99. Id.
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to lie detector tests.10° It also contains express language prohib-
iting waivers. 101
In sum, virtually every major piece of federal labor legislation
provides protections for job applicants. In addition, with the
notable exception of collective-bargaining agreements under the
NLRA, employers generally are not free to demand the waiver
of substantive employee and applicant protections as a condition
of employment.
C. Distinctions
Based on analogies to other areas of constitutional and labor
law, the above analysis suggests that little support or precedent
exists for the distinction between employees and applicants in
the area of substantive rights. Substantive rights are not viewed
as dependent on property interests and, except in very limited
circumstances, cannot be waived freely.
The right of privacy, of course, has not generally been accorded
the same level of legal protection as, for example, the right to
be free from discrimination.0 2 The right of privacy is not abso-
100. 29 U.S.C. S 2002(1) (1988).
101. Section 2005(d) of the Act provides: "The rights and procedures provided by this
chapter may not be waived by contract or otherwise, unless such waiver is part of a
written settlement agreement agreed to and signed by the parties to the pending action
or complaint under this chapter." Id- 5 2005(d).
The 1990 amendments to the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.S. SS 621-634 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991),
are also significant. The issue underlying the ADEA amendments arose when the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a rule that permitted waiver of
rights under the ADEA, provided that such waiver was "knowing and voluntary" and
not in exchange for consideration that included employee benefits to which the employee
was already entitled. EEOC Administrative Exemptions, 29 C.F.R. S 1627.16(c)(1) (1990).
Following issuance of this rule, Congress acted to suspend its implementation in 1989.
The 1990 amendments prohibit waivers of rights or claims arising after the date the
waiver is executed and require that any waiver be "in exchange for consideration in
addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled." 29 U.S.C.S. S
626(f)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). The amendments also set specific criteria for a knowing
and voluntary waiver, including (1) that the waiver be written clearly; (2) that it specifically
refer to rights arising under the ADEA; (3) that the individual be advised in writing to
consult an attorney; and (4) that the individual be given a specified period to consider
the waiver agreement. Id.
These amendments fall short of the 1989 proposal entitled the Age Discrimination in
Employment Waiver Protection Act of 1989. See H.R. REP. No. 221, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1989). That legislation would have flatly prohibited waivers, except as settlements of
specific, individual, bona fide claims of discrimination against the employer. See id. at 1.
102. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to recognize a funda-
mental right of privacy for consensual adult homosexual activity) with Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (striking down on equal protection grounds
gender based distinctions in admission to state nursing school).
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lute. s03 It differs somewhat from other rights because the level
of protection must necessarily vary based on the extent of the
intrusion. 04 The degree of privacy invasions varies greatly-from
obtaining employees' home telephone numbers on one side of the
spectrum, to strip searches and genetic testing on the other.
Because the level of intrusion varies, any standard for assessing
the permissibility of the intrusion must also vary.
Moreover, unlike many other employment rights, privacy is
dependent on a balance between the interests of employers and
employees. Unlike discrimination, for example, employers legiti-
mately need to obtain information about employees-a fact that,
in one way or another, interferes with the employees' privacy.
In addition, the invasions required by employers may be more
or less tailored to the employers' legitimate purposes. Reference
checks, for example, are narrowly tailored to determine an ap-
plicant's performance on a prior job, which, presumably, is highly
correlated with the likelihood of success with new employers.
Drug testing, on the other hand, tests both on- and off-duty
conduct.
Finally, much depends on the level of protection that the right
of privacy is ultimately accorded. Under the California Consti-
tution, most courts agree that a "compelling interest" standard
is applied, and that the "less intrusive alternative test" must be
met as well. 0 5 Under the Fourth Amendment, a balancing test
applies in the drug testing area that appears to give equal weight
to the employers' and employees' interests.106 Even that test,
however, has the effect of limiting drug testing to high risk or
sensitive situations, although it is certainly less stringent than
tests applied in areas such as discrimination. For these reasons,
the standards and distinctions developed in other areas of labor
and constitutional law, although instructive, cannot be applied
mechanically.
103. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1990) (reiterating
the opinion of the lower court); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530-33 (1989); City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 463-64 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
104. See, e.g., Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847; Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537-40.
105. See, e.g., White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34 (Cal. 1975); City of Carmel-By-The-
Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 232 (Cal. 1970).
106. For the use of a balancing test in other Fourth Amendment contexts, see New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1967).
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IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT CASE LAW-THE APPLICANT-
EMPLOYEE DISTINCTION REJECTED
The leading Fourth Amendment cases on drug testing are
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association' 7 and National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,08 which have been ana-
lyzed elsewhere.10 For present purposes, it suffices to recognize
that both cases permit drug testing when the intrusion serves
"special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement," 10 but only when the government's interest in drug
testing outweighs the individual's privacy expectations. In Skin-
ner, the Court upheld postaccident testing of railroad employ-
ees."' In Von Raab, a sharply divided Court upheld one-time
testing of Customs Service employees seeking transfer or pro-
motion to positions within the Service that involved drug inter-
diction or required them to carry firearms or handle classified
materials."2 The Court in Von Raab focused primarily on the
government's "compelling interest in ensuring that front-line
interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable
integrity and judgment.""3
Although rarely viewed in this light, Von Raab involves a
subspecies of applicant testing-testing only current employees
seeking promotion and transfer. Yet, little in the opinion suggests
that the Court relied on the distinction between applicants and
incumbents in reaching its conclusion. The Court speaks of the
employees' privacy interest in terms that ignore the distinction
between employees and applicants." 4
107. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
108. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
109. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first
Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549 (1990); Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Fourth Amendment Implications
of Urine Testing for Evidence of Drug Use in Probation, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 1159 (1990);
Harlin Ray Dean, Jr., Note, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab: The Fourth
Amendment Hangs in the Balance, 68 N.C. L. REv. 389 (1990); Philippa M. Guthrie, Note,
Drug Testing and Welfare: Taking the Drug War to Unconstitutional Limits?, 66 IND. L.J.
579 (1991).
110. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (citing Skinner); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (stating "special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement").
111. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
112. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677.
113. Id. at 670.
114. For example, the Court observed:
We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the interdiction
of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in the line of duty
... have a diminished expectation of privacy.... Unlike most private
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The Court's sole recognition of a distinction between applicants
and incumbents is relegated to a footnote in which the Court
asserted that the procedures established by the Customs Service
for "collection and analysis of the [urine] samples. . . significantly
minimize the program's intrusion on privacy interests."115 One of
the six minimizing factors the Court cited is that "[o]nly employ-
ees who have been tentatively accepted for promotion or transfer
to one of the three categories of covered positions are tested,
and applicants know at the outset that a drug test is a require-
ment of those positions.""16
In sum, although the Court in Von Raab apparently viewed
the fact that only applicants for promotion or transfer are tested
as evidence that the Custom Service's plan was designed to
minimize the intrusion on employees' privacy interests, it at-
tached little significance to this distinction for other purposes.
Less than four months after the Von Raab decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia struck down
a broad plan to conduct random drug tests of incumbent Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) employees holding "sensitive" positions.117
In a carefully reasoned opinion, Chief Judge Wald discussed
whether Von Raab could be distinguished on the ground that,
under the program at issue in Von Raab, "an individual's obli-
gation to undergo testing [could] be triggered only by her own
decision to alter her status within the [Customs] Service.""" The
court in Harmon observed that although "a coherent theory might
be constructed which would make this fundamental distinction
[,] the Supreme Court has not encouraged the construction
citizens or government employees in general, employees involved in drug
interdiction reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness and
probity... . Because successful performance of their duties depends uniquely
on their judgment and dexterity, these employees cannot reasonably expect
to keep from the Service personal information that bears directly on their
fitness. While reasonable tests designed to elicit this information doubtless
infringe some privacy expectations, we do not believe these expectations
outweigh the Government's compelling interests in safety and in the integrity
of our borders.
Id. at 672 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 672 n.2.
116. Id. The other five factors were: (1) advance notice; (2) no direct observation of the
act of urination; (3) samples examined only for specified drugs; (4) combined use of EMIT
and GC/MS tests, enhancing accuracy; and (5) no required disclosure of personal medical
information unless test is positive. Id.; see also Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C.
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 865 (1990).
117. Harmon, 878 F.2d at 491-96.
118. Id. at 489.
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of such a theory."119 The court concluded that although the
distinction between random testing and the applicant testing in
Von Raab "is a relevant consideration; and, in a particularly close
case, it is possible that this factor would tip the scales,"'120 the
distinction did not require the court "to undertake a fundamen-
tally different analysis from that pursued by the Supreme Court
in Von Raab."'2'
Since the decisions in Von Raab and Harmon, a number of
courts have concluded that applicant testing is subject to the
same limitations as other forms of testing and may be performed
only on applicants for dangerous, highly sensitive, or law enforce-
ment jobs.12
Most notable among these decisions is Judge Gesell's opinion
in Willner v. Thornburgh,23 in which the D.C. District Court held
that the DOJ's applicant-testing program violated the Fourth
Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia recently reversed Judge Gesel's decision by a two-
to-one vote.124 Judge Gesell's opinion, however, is worthy of
careful consideration because of the persuasiveness of its argu-
ment.
The plaintiff in that case, an attorney, sought an injunction
barring the DOJ from requiring him to undergo a urine test after
he had tentatively been accepted for employment by the Anti-
trust Division.'2 Under the testing plan, the Antitrust Division
required every individual tentatively selected for employment to
submit a urine sample as a condition of employment.
126
In support of the prescreening test program, the DOJ argued
that (1) "an individual can avoid testing by withdrawing his
application when notified of the testing requirement;"' (2) "the
expectation of privacy and resulting invasion of privacy are less
than that . . . of an existing employee singled out for random
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ga. 1990);
American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 725 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1989). But see
Transportation Inst. v. United States Coast Guard, 727 F. Supp. 648 (D.D.C. 1989).
123. 738 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990), vacated, 928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1991), petition for
cert. fided sub nom Wilner v. Barr, 60 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Sept. 12, 1991) (No. 91-448).
124. Willner, 928 F.2d 1185.
125. Willner, 738 F. Supp. at 1.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Id. at 3.
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testing;"'1 and (3) "the need for drug-testing of applicants is
enhanced by the reduced opportunity to observe these individuals
as compared to existing employees."'u
Relying principally on Harmon, Judge Gesell rejected each of
these arguments."3 As to the argument that applicants have a
reduced expectation of privacy because they are informed in
advance of the testing requirement and may withdraw their
application, the court concluded that an unreasonable search
cannot be made reasonable by the applicant's consent, if that
consent is a prerequisite to employment. 1 1
Judge Gesell also rejected the DOJ's argument that it had a
stronger interest in testing applicants because it lacked the
opportunity to observe applicants. 13 2 Although conceding, based
on Harmon, that this was "'one element to be weighed in the
balance,' ,"' the court noted that DOJ attorneys work in tradi-
tional office environments in which employers can observe them
and that the -attorneys are subject to an extremely thorough
background investigation before hiring.3" The court concluded,
"[s]urely this process is as likely to uncover any applicant rea-
sonably suspected of having a drug problem as presumably occurs
in a traditional office setting."'3 5
On appeal, two members of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court panel concluded, over a strong dissent, that urine tests of
applicants for positions as attorneys at the DOJ do not constitute
unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. The panel
first determined that the "'Fourth Amendment intrusion serve[d]
special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement.' "136 Balancing the extent of the privacy intrusion
against the government's needs, the court concluded that the
applicant's privacy rights were significantly diminished because:
(1) under DOJ procedures, the urination process was not wit-
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 4 (citing National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935,
943 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. (quoting Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 865 (1990)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed
sub nom. Willner v. Barr, 60 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Sept. 12, 1991) (No. 91-448) (quoting
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)).
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nessed; (2) the applicant had already consented to an extensive
FBI investigation of his background; (3) the applicant had advance
notice and was not "compelled to seek a job at the Department
of Justice"; and (4) applicant drug testing is common in the private
sector, which, the opinion suggests, "is some indication of what
expectations of privacy 'society is prepared to accept as "reason-
able." ' "137 These points, the court ruled, weakened the privacy
interests of applicants to such an extent that they were out-
weighed by the government's economic interest in compiling
pertinent information predicting how an applicant will perform
before expending time and money to train him.138
The dissent, on the other hand, observed that the majority
holding is inconsistent with the principles established in Von
Raab, Skinner, and Harmon.19 First, the dissent noted that pre-
vious Fourth Amendment cases have required that there be a
nexus between the duties of the employee and the harm the
government seeks to avert. Yet the majority opinion "fails even
to consider the relationship between the duties of a Justice
Department antitrust lawyer and the threat that lawyer could
pose if drug-impaired."1 4 Whatever the distinction between ap-
plicants and employees, the dissent observed, those differences
"affect privacy expectations and not the link required between
an employee's duties and the dangers posed by his drug use."'4'
The dissent also asserted that the majority in Willner gave
undue weight to notice as diminishing privacy expectations, not-
ing: "The same factor was present in Von Raab, but the Court
there attributed little, if any significance to it, merely identifying
it in a footnote, without elaboration, as affecting the employees'
privacy expectations."' 142
Finally, the dissent rejected as "potentially dangerous" the
majority's reliance on the prevalence of private sector applicant
testing as "the yardstick by which we measure the government's
compliance with constitutional mandates."'143 "The protections the
Constitution provides against arbitrary government action," the
dissent remarked, "will quickly evaporate if courts adopt, as the
137. Id. at 1189-92 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967)).
138. Id. at 1192-93.
139. Id. at 1194-95 (Henderson, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1195.
141. id. at 1195 n.2.
142. I& at 1198 (footnote omitted).
143. Id.
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benchmark of fourth amendment reasonableness, the conduct of
private entities."144
Although it purports to follow the standards set out in Von
Raab, Skinner, and Harmon, the result reached by the Willner
majority is sharply at odds with those cases, as well as the
weight of other Fourth Amendment precedent. More distressing
than the weight given to the notice/waiver rationale as lessening
applicants' privacy interest is the court's failure to articulate any
coherent interest on the government's side of the scale. The
majority relies solely on general statistics linking drug use with
accidents and absenteeism, and the observation that, unlike cur-
rent employees, applicants cannot be observed on the job. Al-
though the Willner majority does not say so, it is difficult to
imagine any applicant testing program that would be found to
be "unreasonable" under the formulation of the circuit court's
opinion in Willner.145
Significantly, despite the circuit court's decision in Willner,
however, at least two district courts have reached a result similar
to that reached by Judge Gesell.' 46 In Georgia Association of
Educators v. Harris,47 the court invalidated a Georgia law man-
dating, among other things, that all applicants for state employ-
ment submit to a preemployment drug test.1 48 Relying on Von
Raab and Harmon, the court held that Georgia's "generalized
governmental interest in maintaining a drug-free workplace" was
insufficient to outweigh the applicants' privacy interests.149 The
court stated:
The court finds it difficult to even begin applying [the Von
Raab] balancing test ... because defendants have failed to
specifically identify any governmental interest that is suffi-
ciently compelling to justify testing alt job applicants....
[D]efendants remain oblivious to Von Raab's (and indeed, the
144. Id. at 1199; see also id. at 1199 n.6.
145. The circuit court decision also contains an unusually candid statement of a principle
that has undoubtedly influenced the development of the law in this area: that the
prevalence of across-the-board applicant testing in the private sector is itself a justification
for the refusal to recognize privacy rights implicated by drug testing. Id. at 1191. This
principle underscores the self-fulfilling nature of privacy invasions in general, and of
applicant drug testing in particular.
146. See Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110, 1114 (NJ). Ga. 1990);
United States Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 725 F. Supp. 87, 90 (D. Mass. 1989).
147. 749 F. Supp. 1110.
148. Id. at 1114.
149. Id.
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Fourth Amendment's) requirement that it connect its interest
in testing to the particular job duties of the applicants it
wishes to test.15
The court declined to rule specifically on the defendants' con-
tention that job applicants have "a diminished. expectation of
privacy under the fourth amendment as compared to existing
employees," because defendants had failed to articulate a sub-
stantial governmental interest in testing all applicants. 151
Another across-the-board testing program was rejected in United
States Postal Workers Union v. Frank.5 2 In that case, the Postal
Service imposed a requirement that all applicants for career
employment with the Postal Service in Boston submit to urinal-
ysis solely for research purposes to evaluate the correlation
between preemployment drug testing and job performance.153 The
court specifically observed that "review of the law, albeit scanty,
on the distinction between prospective employees and current
employees does not convince me that job applicants should be
accorded lesser fourth amendment protections." 154
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 725 F. Supp. 87, 90 (D. Mass. 1989).
153. Id. at 88.
154. Id. at 90. This is not to say that other courts have found no distinction between
applicant and employee drug testing. As noted, Harmon v. Thornburgh suggests that the
difference between applicant testing and employee testing might be enough to tip the
balance in a close case. 878 F.2d 484, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1989). cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 865
(1990). Other cases echo similar sentiments. In at least one case involving crewmen on
vessels registered in the United States, a court concluded that the difference was sufficient
to tip the balance. See Transportation Inst. v. United States Coast Guard, 727 F. Supp.
649 (D.D.C. 1989).
In Transportation Institute, the court evaluated Coast Guard regulations requiring drug
tests of private citizens employed on United States flag vessels. Id. at 651. Theccourt
held that the random testing requirements for employees were overbroad. Id. at 658.
The court, however, upheld the testing of applicants on the ground that applicants'
privacy rights are "significantly diminished." Id. at 654 (citing Harmon, 878 F.2d at 489).
In particular, the court observed: (1) preemployment testing requires testing on only one
occasion, id. at 654; (2) physical examinations and drug testing are already widespread
employment practices in the maritime industry, id. at 655; and (3) "pre-employment
testing involves none of the employer discretion that is necessarily present in post-
accident, for-cause, and random testing, since almost all prospective crewmembers are
tested," id.
Significantly, however, Transportation Institute did not involve across-the-board testing.
See id. at 651. All those tested were crewmen aboard boats, in a highly regulated industry
in which the government contended (and plaintiffs largely conceded) that all personnel
were responsible for safety-related functions in emergencies. Id. at 656. This situation is
significantly different from one involving the testing of office workers.
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Finally, at least one circuit has rejected squarely the "waiver"
rationale in the context of a Fourth Amendment challenge to
drug testing.5 5 In National Federation of Federal Employees v.
Weinberger,156 the D.C. Circuit Court held that "a search other-
wise unreasonable cannot be redeemed by a public employer's
exaction of a 'consent' to the search as a condition of employ-
ment."' 57
In sum, courts that have considered applicant testing in the
Fourth Amendment context since the Von Raab decision have
generally (1) applied the same standards to applicant and em-
ployee testing and, as a result of that application, (2) have rejected
across-the-board applicant testing programs. 158
V. STATE DRUG-TESTING CASES AND STATUTES
Despite the lack of support for the distinction between appli-
cants and employees in other substantive rights contexts, in the
private sector, few cases or statutes provide any significant
protection against across-the-board testing of job applicants.
That courts have failed to recognize such limitations is not
entirely surprising because, for the most part, legislatures have
yet to recognize the privacy interests of private sector employees.
Most state and local legislatures have imposed only minor pro-
cedural limitations on applicant or employee testing. Although
these protections apply often to both employees and applicants,
they provide no basis for challenging the testing itself. A few
jurisdictions, including the City and County of San Francisco,
have strictly regulated employee testing but imposed no restric-
tions whatever on applicant testing.5 9
155. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 943.
158. The District of Columbia Circuit Court opinion in Willner, although purporting to
be based on the same legal standards as the other cases cited, in fact would represent a
very significant broadening of permissible applicant testing programs under the Fourth
Amendment if it is allowed to stand and is followed by other courts.
159. The regulations currently in force in San Francisco provide:
SEC. 3300A.1. POLICY. It is the public policy of the City and County of
San Francisco that all citizens enjoy the full benefit of the right to privacy
in the workplace guaranteed to them by Article 1, Section 1 of the California
Constitution. It is the purpose of this Article to protect employees against
unreasonable inquiry and investigation into off-the-job conduct, associations,
and activities not directly related to the actual performance of job respon-
sibilities.
SEC. 3300A.2. DEFINITIONS. (1) Employee shall mean any person working
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When no significant protections exist for employees or appli-
cants subject to testing, employees have resorted to wrongful
discharge claims as a means of litigating drug-testing challenges.
for salary or wages within the City and County of San Francisco, other than
members of the uniformed ranks of the police, sheriffs and fire departments,
police department communication dispatchers, and any persons operating
emergency service vehicles for the City and County of San Francisco.
(3) Employer shall mean the City and County of San Francisco, any
individual, firm, corporation, partnership, or other organization or group of
persons however organized, located or doing business within the City and
County of San Francisco, that employs personnel for salary or wages, or any
person acting as an agent of such an organization.
SEC. 3300 A.5. EMPLOYER PROHIBITED FROM TESTING EMPLOYEES.
No employer may demand, require, or request employees to submit to, to
take or to undergo any blood, urine, or encephalographic test in the body
as a condition of continued employment. Nothing herein shall prohibit an
employer from requiring a specific employee to submit to blood or urine
testing if:
(a) The employer has reasonable grounds to believe that an employee's
faculties are impaired on the job; and
(b) The employee is in a position where such impairment presents a clear
and present danger to the physical safety of the employee, another employee
or to a member of the public; and
(c) The employer provides the employee, at the employer's expense, the
opportunity to have the sample tested or evaluated by State licensed inde-
pendent laboratory/testing facility and provides the employee with a reason-
able opportunity to rebut or explain the results.
In conducting those tests designed to identify the presence of chemical
substances in the body, and not prohibited by this Section, the employer
shall ensure to the extent feasible that the test only measures and that its
records only show or make use of information regarding chemical substances
in the body which are likely to affect the ability of the employee to perform
safely his or her duties while on the job.
Under no circumstances may employers request, require or conduct random
or company-wide blood, urine or encephalographic testing.
In any action brought under this Article alleging that the employer had
violated this Section, the employer shall have the burden of providing that
the requirements of Subsections (a), (b) and (c) as stated above have been
satisfied.
SEC. 3300 A.6. MEDICAL SCREENING FOR EXPOSURE TO TOXIC
SUBSTANCES. Nothing in this Article shall prevent any employer from
conducting medical screening, with the express written consent of the em-
ployees, to monitor exposure to toxic or other unhealthy substances in the
workplace or in the performance of their job responsibilities. Any such
screenings or tests must be limited to the specified substances expressly
identified in the employee consent form.
SEC. 3300A.7. PROHIBITING USE OF INTOXICATING SUBSTANCES
DURING WORKING HOURS; DISCIPLINE FOR BEING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING SUBSTANCES DURING WORKING
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As a result, in some jurisdictions, employees may have somewhat
greater protections than applicants-but this result is not based
on any distinction related to privacy rights.
One state court decision, however, is particularly worth noting.
In California, where a broad state constitutional right of privacy
exists, the sole court decision addressing the issue of applicant
testing, the case of Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp.,'6 held that
applicants are entitled to significantly less privacy protection
than incumbent employees.' 6'
In Wilkinson, the California Court of Appeal upheld employer
Matthew Bender's requirement that all applicants who received
a conditional offer of employment submit to a physical examina-
tion that included drug screening 62 Despite considerable author-
ity to the contrary, the court declined to apply a "compelling
interest" standard to Matthew Bender's testing program, observ-
ing that "not every act which has some impact on personal
privacy invokes the protections of the state's Constitution and
requires [a compelling interest] justification."'' 1 Instead, the court
determined that "the operative question is whether the chal-
lenged conduct is reasonable."'"
In determining reasonableness, the court observed that
[T]he most important factor in our analysis is that plaintiffs
are applicants for employment, not employees, either public or
HOURS. Nothing in this Article shall restrict an employer's ability to prohibit
the use of intoxicating substances during work hours, or restrict an employ-
er's ability to discipline employees for being under the influence of intoxi-
cating substances during work hours.
SEC. 3300A.8. ENFORCEMENT. (a) Any aggrieved person may enforce
the provisions of this Article by means of a civil action. Any person who
violates any of the provisions of this Article or who aids in the violation of
this Article shall be liable to the person aggrieved for special and general
damages, together with attorney's fees and the costs of action.
(b) Injunction.
(1) Any person who commits, or proposes to commit, an act in violation of
this Article may be enjoined therefrom by any court of competent jurisdic-
tion.
(2) An action for injunctive relief under this subsection may be brought
by any aggrieved person, by the District Attorney, or by the City Attorney,
or by any person or entity which will fairly and adequately represent the
interest of the protected class.
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE art. 33A (1985) (emphasis added) (code history infor-
mation omitted).
160. 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1989).
161. See id. at 203.
162. Id. at 203-04.
163. Id. at 202.
164. Id. at 203.
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private. Any individual who chooses to seek employment nec-
essarily also chooses to disclose certain personal information
to prospective employers, such as employment and educational
history, and to allow the prospective employer to verify that
information. As applicants for employment with Matthew
Bender, when plaintiffs were asked to consent to drug and
alcohol screening as a condition of an offer of employment,
they were in effect asked to disclose voluntarily the personal
information which might be revealed by that screening.165
The court then suggested three factors that minimized the
intrusiveness of Matthew Bender's program.166 First, the court
asserted that California equal employment laws authorize private
employers to condition an offer of employment on the results of
a physical examination to determine fitness. 167 Because urinalysis
is ordinarily a routine part of any physical examination, the court
reasoned that applicants should have anticipated "that diagnostic
test."16 Second, Matthew Bender's policy was to specifically in-
form a job applicant that a job offer was conditioned on the
applicant's consent to a drug test. 69 Next, the testing and con-
fidentiality procedures were designed to minimize intrusion.170
Finally, the court observed:
Simply put, applicants for jobs at Matthew Bender have a
choice; they may consent to the limited invasion of their privacy
resulting from the testing, or may decline both the test and
the conditional offer of employment. Applicants. . . who choose
not to consent to the test, are not foreclosed by Matthew
Bender's policy from seeking other employment. 1
7
'
165. Id.
166. Id. at 204.
167. Id.
168. Id- at 203.
169. Id.
170. Id. Specifically. (1) persons unrelated to the employer collected samples in a
medical environment during a preemployment physical; (2) no one observed applicants
while they furnished samples; (3) no pregnancy tests were required; (4) medical history
and results were kept confidential; (5) the employer was not provided with the information
in the medical history file; (6) the employer was informed only if applicants were not
recommended for employment, which did not necessarily mean that those applicants
tested positive for drugs; (7) applicants given an unsatisfactory rating were entitled to
know what portion of the test they failed and to challenge the results; and (8) applicants
who rated unsatisfactory could reapply after six months. Id.
171. Id. at 204. The court in Wilkinson also expressly rejected the plaintiffs' reliance
on the California cases decided on the basis of unconstitutional conditions. Citing Utility
Workers, Local No. 246 v. Southern California Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1988),
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Wilkinson is the purest statement to date of the argument
that an applicant may be given the choice between "consenting"
to drug testing or seeking another job.172
VI. THE FLAWS OF APPLICANT TESTING
As discussed in Part II, three primary rationales have been
espoused for distinguishing between applicants and incumbent
employees in the drug-testing context: (1) the privacy interest of
applicants is lesser or may be more readily waived as a condition
of employment because they have notice and may choose to "walk
away;" (2) the employers' interest in testing applicants is greater;
and (3) broad applicant testing deters drug use and therefore
assists in the war on drugs. None of these hold up under close
legal or policy examination.
A. Just Walk Away-Attacking the Notice/Waiver Rationale
The notice/waiver rationale is actually a constellation of various
legal theories and factual assumptions. One argument is that
applicants' privacy interests are diminished relative to the inter-
ests of incumbent employees because the applicants have notice
that they will be subject to testing. A related but slightly
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989), one of the recent decisions holding that drug testing
may be negotiated in a collective-bargaining agreement, the court in Wilkinson concluded
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not apply to drug testing by a private
person or entity. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
Only a few months after the Wilkinson decision, another appellate panel reached the
opposite conclusion in a case involving across-the-board employee testing. In Luck v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
344 (1990), the California Court of Appeal upheld a nearly half-million dollar jury verdict
against Southern Pacific, based upon the termination of a computer programmer for
refusal to submit to a random drug test. Id. at 621. Affirming the jury's verdict on a
contractual claim founded on the right of privacy, the court concluded that the compelling
interest test applied and that the defendant had not established a compelling interest.
Id. at 629-32.
Read together, Luck and Wilkinson suggest that, at least under the California right of
privacy, applicant testing is subject to significantly less scrutiny than employee testing.
However, it is difficult to read too much into these cases because the analysis in Luck
indicates that the court did not rely on the distinction between applicants and employees
as a basis for applying the compelling interest test. The holding in Luck, as well as a
more recent case involving college athletes in which drug testing was permanently
enjoined, Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Ct. App.), review
granted, 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1990), leave open the possibility that another panel of the
court of appeal may yet apply the compelling interest standard to applicant drug
screening.
172. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
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different argument is that although the applicants' privacy inter-
ests may not vary, their interest in employment is lesser. Both
of these approaches assume that the applicants' interests are
balanced against the employers' interests, and that the applicants'
interests are sufficiently weakened by one or both factors so as
to be outweighed by the employers' interest in across-the-board
testing.
Yet a third approach is "waiver." This approach recognizes
that the applicants' lesser interest in employment does not fit
neatly into the balancing scheme because the balance is between
the applicants' privacy interest and the employers' interest. In-
stead, this approach relies on the theory that the applicants'
lesser interest in employment means they may be given the
choice of surrendering that limited interest or surrendering their
privacy interest. The relevance of the applicants' presumably
"small" interest in any particular employment is that, for a waiver
to be valid, at a minimum it must be "voluntary." Therefore,
presumably, the applicants' interest in employment is so specu-
lative and slight that being forced to give it up as a condition of
waiver does not render the waiver involuntary.
Underlying all three of these approaches are a variety of factual
assumptions: the assumption that applicants in fact have little
interest in, or need for, particular jobs; the assumption that jobs
are comparatively easy to find; the assumption that not all
employers in a particular industry or field will demand a similar
invasion as a condition of employment; and the assumption that
applicants understand and have been informed of their rights
and can intelligently weigh their alternatives.
To paraphrase Justice Scalia's dissent in Von Raab, looking to
the theories underlying the notice/waiver rationale, there is much
that is true that is not obviously relevant. Looking to the factual
assumptions, there is much that is relevant that is not obviously
true.173
1. Privacy Interests Do Not Vary
Some courts and commentators have sought to distinguish
applicants and employees with regard to the waiver rationale by
asserting that applicants have a lesser privacy interest.174 At
173. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656. 682 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. See discussion infra part VI.A.3.
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first blush, this argument is difficult to fathom. Both the Fourth
Amendment and California cases establish that drug testing is a
significant invasion of personal privacy. Courts and commentators
analyzing the issue have generally focused on three types of
invasion: (1) the physical invasion inherent in the taking of the
sample -particularly if observed;175 (2) the invasion that results
from analyzing the contents of one's body and drawing inferences
about that individual's behavior from that information;17 and (3)
the invasion resulting from the employee or applicant's need to
explain the use of legal drugs. 77 Each of these invasions is
identical for employees and applicants.
Some have argued that although the applicants' objective pri-
vacy expectations are the same as the employees' expectations,
the applicants' subjective expectation of privacy is diminished by
advance notice before applying.78 Although this kind of analysis
175. Although some have suggested that the act of obtaining the sample is minimally
intrusive, the overwhelming majority of courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, has rejected this argument. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,
489 U.S. 602 (1989). the Supreme Court quoted the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Von Raab:
"There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the
passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about
it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without public observation;
indeed, its performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as
social custom."
Id. at 617 (quoting Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 175); see also id. at 626 ("procedures... which
require employees to perform an excretory function [are] traditionally shielded by great
privacy"); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1988)
("In our society, it is expected that urination be performed in private, that urine be
disposed of in private and that the act, if mentioned at all, be described in euphemistic
terms.").
176. See, e.g., Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F,2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Because drug
tests often furnish information about employee activities occurring outside of working
hours, such tests may provide.., a periscope through which [testers] can peer into an
individual's behavior in her private life, even in her own home."), vacated, 490 U.S. 1001
(1989); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986) ("[u]rine testing
involves one of the most private of functions").
177. See, e.g., Bangert v. Hodel, 705 F. Supp. 643, 649 (D.D.C. 1989) ('The problem [with
drug testing] ... is that the urinalysis test picks up not merely illegal drugs but also
legal ones, and an employee faced with such findings will have to explain to the
Department's officers the possibly intimate details of his legitimate drug-taking and the
underlying illness or illnesses.").
178. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ("Advance notice of the employer's condition ... may be taken into account as one
of the factors relevant to the extent of the employees' legitimate expectations of privacy.");
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir. 1986) ("the pervasive regulation of the
industry ... reduced the justifiable privacy expectation"); Security & Law Enforcement
Employees v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 1984) ("based upon the nature of their
place of employment and the notice provided ... [the employees'] subjective expectations
necessarily were diminished significantly").
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has long been used under the Fourth Amendment, it has limited
utility in the context of drug testing and other bodily invasions.
As the California Supreme Court observed, "[als a general rule,
the state cannot curtail a person's right of privacy by announcing
and carrying out a system of surveillance which diminishes that
person's expectations." 179 The court noted that "[p]rivacy is not
safe if a search or intrusion can be justified merely by proof that
the state announced its intention in advance. . '[S]uch a con-
cept would sanction an erosion of the Fourth Amendment by the
simple and expedient device of its universal violation.' "0 If an
individual's expectation of privacy in his own body could be
reduced by notice, the right of privacy would be virtually mean-
ingless.
Finally, as Von Raab, Harmon, and Willner suggest, at most
these factors may tip the balance in a close case. They certainly
do not, in themselves, form a basis upon which testing may be
justified. Put another way, one cannot argue that an invasion of
privacy is justified simply because the invasion could have been
worse.
2. The Applicants' Interest in Employment
Arguably, the interest of applicants in employment is less than
that of incumbent employees. This argument presents three pri-
mary difficulties. First, employers do not test mere applicants-
they test people who have conditional offers of employment.
Second, as a factual matter, these conditional hires may have a
very great stake in the job for which they are applying, though
179. DeLancie v. Superior Court, 647 P.2d 142, 148 n-11 (Cal. 1982) (citing Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974); Paul
C. Giannelli & Francis A. Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the Fourth
Amendment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1060 (1976)); see also
Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1189-90 (D.C. Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed sub
noa. Willner v. Barr, 60 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Sept. 12, 1991) (No. 91-448).
180. DeLancie, 647 P.2d at 149 (quoting People v. Hyde, 524 P.2d 830, 833 n.4 (Cal.
1974)); see also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) in which the Court stated:
An employee may bring closed luggage to the office prior to leaving on a
trip, or a handbag or briefcase each workday. While whatever expectation
of privacy the employee has in the existence or outward appearance of the
luggage is affected by its presence in the workplace, the employee's expec-
tation of privacy in the contents of the luggage is not affected in the same
way. The appropriate standard for a workplace search does not necessarily
apply to a piece of closed personal luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase that
happens to be within the employer's business address.
Id. at 716.
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perhaps less than that of incumbent employees. Third, even to
the extent some difference may exist in the stakes of applicants
and employees, the relevance of this distinction to the legal
analysis is questionable.
a. The Value of Employment
Most employers do not test all applicants for employment
because the cost would be enormous and entirely unnecessary.
Instead, employers generally make a tentative selection of appli-
cants and make an offer of employment contingent on passing a
drug test. Thus, by the time the applicants are required to decide
between taking the test and preserving their privacy, they have
a great deal more at stake than mere initial applicants do. They
are giving up a job in hand. It is very difficult to distinguish
these applicants in terms of their interest in the job from pro-
bationary employees who have worked for six months. 81
Courts, legislatures, and commentators have long recognized
the importance of employment-not just continued employment
but also prospective employment. The Supreme Court has "fre-
quently recognized the severity of depriving a person of the
means of livelihood. 1812 Indeed, that concern underlies many of
the cases cited in the previous section, including especially Ru-
tan.'8 As Justice Douglas observed:
The right to work, I had assumed, was the most precious
liberty that man possesses. Man has indeed as much right to
work as he has to live, to be free, to own property. The
American ideal was stated by Emerson in his essay on Politics,
"A man has a right to be employed, to be trusted, to be loved,
to be revered." It does many men little good to stay alive and
free and propertied, if they cannot work. To work means to
181. Some, but not all employers, seek to mitigate this problem by giving all applicants
notice that a drug test will be required at the time of their initial application. A few
employers even obtain written consent to perform the test at the time of the initial
application. These procedures are laudable, but do not change the fact that, at the time
they actually undergo the test, applicants have more than a speculative interest in the
job they are seeking. But see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
182. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) (citing Fusari v.
Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975)); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
183. Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990); see also supra notes 40-45 and
accompanying text.
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eat. It also means to live. For many it would be better to work
in jail, than to sit idle on the curb.'8
Even without the impediment of retaining an attachment to
one's privacy rights, jobs do not always grow on trees. Unem-
ployment rates exist and are particularly high for minorities and
youths. They are also particularly high in certain industries and
among individuals with specialized skills. Rutan, for example,
recognized that the government is the primary employer for
many occupations. 1m This problem is exacerbated by the fact that
applicant drug screening has become routine in entire industries,
such as the defense industry. Even employers in such industries
who initially opposed drug testing have been forced to test for
fear that they will end up with all the drug users that their
competitors have already screened out.e
Moreover, people who are handicapped by their youth, old age,
educational level, minority status, or who have skills that are
specific to certain industries, may not be able to find other jobs
easily, if at all. What they are forced to give up in exchange for
their privacy may be very significant.
"Recreational users," at least, can stop using drugs, give up
their privacy rights, and get a job. But what about individuals
who have serious drug problems? These people already suffer
from a serious disadvantage in the job market-a disadvantage
that receives at least limited protection in federal handicap law. 187
184. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In
a similar vein, one labor scholar has observed:
[1n a modern industrialized economy employment is central to one's existence
and dignity. One's job provides not only income essential to the acquisition
of the necessaries of life, but also the opportunity to shape the aspirations
of one's family, aspirations which are both moral and educational. Along with
marital relations and religion, it is hard to think of what might be viewed
as more vital in our society than the opportunity to work.
Gould, supra note 42, at 892.
185. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2738; see also Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 595 P.2d 592, 599 (Cal. 1979) ("the injurious effect of arbitrary exclusion . . . loom[s]
significantly larger in the case of a monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic public utility").
186. Certain private employers are also being forced to implement drug testing in
order to continue to serve government contracts for the Departments of Defense and
Transportation, pursuant to the Drug-Free Workplace Act, 41 U.S.C. SS 701-707 (1988).
187. See 29 U.S.C. S 706(8XB) (1988) which excludes from the definition of handicapped
under SS 793 and 794 "any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current
use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job
in question." (emphasis added). A number of courts have viewed this section as providing
limited protection to alcoholics and drug addicts. See, e.g., School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 285 n.14 (1987) (noting that Congress did not exclude all alcoholics and drug abusers
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For these individuals, drug screening operates to the disadvan-
tage of a "class of persons. . . already subject to disadvantages
not shared by the remainder of the community."Iee Increased
drug testing will create a further disadvantage for those people:
"ineligibility for employment in a major sector of the economy." 189
Applicants have a very significant stake in the jobs for which
they have been tentatively selected. Whether that stake is greater
or lesser than the stake of incumbent employees depends on the
circumstances of each individual case. Many incumbent employees
would have a far easier time finding another job than many who
are unemployed. Moreover, many who are employed have suffi-
cient assets and protections, such as unemployment insurance, to
sustain them until they find another job. It certainly cannot be
said categorically that applicants, particularly those who have
been tentatively selected for employment, have a lesser stake in
any particular employment.
b. The Relevance of the Employment Interest
Even if a significant difference between applicants and em-
ployees existed in terms of their stake in any particular job, it
is unclear how this stake plays a role in the legal analysis. If
one applies the Fourth Amendment balancing test delineated in
Von Raab and Skinner, the interest to be weighed on the em-
ployees' side of the scale is the "interference with individual
liberty that results [from the drug test],"1 not the job the
applicant must give up to preserve her rights. If one applies the
compelling interest test used in most of the California cases, the
employer must establish that the value accruing to the public
"manifestly outweigh[s] any resulting impairment of constitu-
from the definition of handicapped); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1231
n.8 (7th Cir. 1980) (determining that plaintiff's alcoholism did not "militate against [the]
finding that he is an 'otherwise qualified handicapped individual' "); Nisperos v. Buck, 720
F. Supp. 1424, 1427 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that a rehabilitated drug or alcohol abuser
is a protected handicapped person); Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp.
590, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (construing federal law to protect rehabilitated drug and alcohol
abusers and those seeking rehabilitation); see also Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,114(a) (West Supp. 1991) (excluding an individual "engaging in the
illegal use of drugs" from the definition of "qualified individual with a disability").
188. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976) (striking down a Civil Service
Commission ban on alien employment as deprivation of a liberty interest).
189. Id.
190. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989); accord
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) ("[glovernment's
compelling interests outweigh privacy concerns").
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tional rights"191-in other words, the impairment of privacy rights.
Indeed, even the court in Wilkinson, which held that the most
important factor in its analysis was that the plaintiffs were
applicants, defined its "test" as whether "[the employer's] request
[to drug test] so substantially burden[ed] plaintiffs' right of pmvacy
that the request was constitutionally. . . impermissible."' 92 None
of these tests focus on how much the plaintiff must give up in
exchange for privacy.
3. Waiver As Condition of Employment-A Contradiction in
Terms?
Should employers be permitted to demand as a condition of
employment that applicants "waive" any privacy protections which
may apply to drug testing? The discussion in Parts III and IV
suggests that permitting such a waiver of a substantive right
would be anomalous. Indeed, virtually no other substantive right
regarding employment, whether provided by the Constitution or
by federal statute, is subject to routine waiver in the preem-
ployment context. The discussion in Parts II and VI.A.1-.2 sug-
gests that in the Fourth Amendment context, courts, including
the Supreme Court, have declined to adopt the waiver analysis.
Arguably, the right of privacy may be distinguished from other
rights in employment. Unlike other employment rights, it is
frequently suggested that the right of privacy may be waived.
In almost every context in which the right of privacy is recog-
nized, courts have accepted some form of consent or waiver.
Examples include: physical examinations, 193 discovery of personal
information in court cases,194 personnel records, 95 employment
references, 96 insurance applications, 97 Fourth Amendment
191. Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 421 P.2d 409, 415 (Cal. 1966); accord
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 416-17, 422 (Ct. App.), revew
granted 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1990).
192. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 203 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis
added).
193. See, e.g., Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 785 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1989).
194. See, e.g., Davis v. Ross, 107 F.R.D. 326, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
195. See, e.g., Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 (Okla. 1986).
196. See, e.g., Littman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1549, 1560 (11th
Cir. 1984).
197. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 F.2d 381, 383 (6th Cir.
1937).
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rights,198 Fifth Amendment rights,199 tortious invasions of the
right of privacy, 20° and tortious and criminal trespass, to name
only a few.
This point, however, may reflect a confusion between the
concepts of consent and waiver. Employees are frequently asked
to consent to various intrusions on their privacy interests; but
the question for present purposes is not whether applicants or
employees may consent to an invasion, but whether employers
may require that the right of privacy be waived when a job hangs
in the balance. The answer to this question should be no.
Few suggest that a waiver can be valid when incumbent
employees are faced with the choice of losing their jobs or taking
a drug test. The issue is whether applicants differ in some
relevant way.
As discussed, the interests of employees and applicants do not
differ significantly. The privacy interests of each are equal.
Although advance notice may diminish the intrusiveness of drug
testing, it does not in any way diminish the privacy right.
Applicants' interests in a particular job, though not "vested,"
may also be very great. This is especially true if employment is
scarce for individuals with particular skills; if the individual is a
member of a group that suffers from high unemployment such
as the young, the handicapped, and minorities; or if the individual
suffers from other handicaps such as drug addiction, poor edu-
cation, illiteracy, or lack of job skills.
The Supreme Court recognizes the "individual's 'core' common
law 'liberty' interest in freedom to follow a chosen profession."2' 1
Few rights are more important and few needs greater than the
right and need of employment. To recognize that employees also
have a significant right of privacy with respect to their employers
is to recognize that the power of employers over their employees
has limits. It is also to recognize that because of the imbalance
in bargaining power between employers and employees, the state
must step in to protect that right.202
198. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
199. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
200. See generally Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Waiver or Loss of Right of Privacy, 57
A.L.R.3d 16 (1974) (discussing the circumstances under which a right to sue in tort for
invasion of privacy may be waived or lost).
201. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 705-06.
202. The inequality of bargaining power between an applicant and an employer was
one of the motivations underlying some of this country's most fundamental labor legis-
lation, including the NLRA and the FLSA. As Senator Wagner observed when he
[Vol. 33:47
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Both courts and legislatures have implicitly recognized that to
permit the waiver of a substantive right as a condition of em-
ployment-whether preemployment or postemployment-is to
make that right virtually meaningless. 2 3 As recently as two years
ago, Congress rejected such waivers in the employee polygraph
context;204 as recently as last year, the Supreme Court rejected
it in the context of political patronage. 20 5 Most important for
current purposes, the Supreme Court in Von Raab eschewed an
obvious opportunity to employ the waiver theory in the very
context addressed here.
Arguably, the position rejecting waivers proves too much.
After all, few would argue that an applicant should not be
required to sign a release authorizing a prospective employer to
check into her previous employment. However, rejecting the
notion of waiver does not mean that all intrusions are prohibited.
Privacy rights are subject to balancing. There are greater and
lesser invasions, there are greater and lesser justifications for
invasions, and there are more and less precisely tailored inva-
sions. This balancing scheme is the appropriate means for deter-
mining permissible and prohibited invasions. With respect to
introduced the Labor Disputes Act (a predecessor to the NLRA) in March 1934: "We are
forced to recognize the futility of pretending that there is equality of freedom when a
single workman, with only his job between his family and ruin, sits down to draw a
contract of employment with a representative of a tremendous organization. . . ." 78
CONG. REC. 3679 (1934), quoted in Peter Phillips, Comment, The Contractual Waiver of
Individual Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 793,
798 (1986).
When such inequality of bargaining power exists, resulting agreements have been held
to be unduly oppressive or unconscionable "contracts of adhesion." See, e.g., Graham v.
Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal. 1981) (" 'standardized contract, which, imposed
and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing
party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it' ") (quoting Neal v. State
Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Ct. App. 1961)); In re Cross & Brown Co., 167
N.Y.S.2d 573 (App. Div. 1957) (holding invalid a provision in employment contract that
provided that any dispute be arbitrated before the employer).
Such inequality of bargaining power may also invalidate "exculpatory clauses" releasing
parties from tort liability. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441
(Cal. 1963) (invalidating hospital admission form releasing hospital from future liability
for negligence); Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465, 469 & n.7 (Cal. 1978)
(deeming invalid a residential rental agreement exculpating landlord from liability for
injury due to negligence, based on "severe shortage of low-cost housing"). Note that
Henrioul/e also provides an excellent list of other jurisdictions holding such clauses in
residential rental agreements invalid. See Henrioulle, 573 P.2d at 469-70; see also CAL.
CIV. CODE S 1668 (West 1985) (making exculpatory contracts unlawful).
203. See supra notes 58-63, 100-01 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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employment references, for example, the employer has a strong
interest in obtaining such references, and the applicant has a
comparatively minor privacy interest. The employer's interest is
also very narrowly tailored. Under any reasonable balancing test,
the employer's interest in obtaining references will prevail.
Rejecting "waiver" does not mean rejecting "consent." Once
the employer shows that the balance tips in its favor, it means
only that the employer is free to condition employment on the
applicant's agreement to submit to the invasion. "Consent" re-
mains important because a process must be created to ensure
that, even if the employer's interest outweighs that of the appli-
cant, the applicant is informed of her rights and is given the
choice of either submitting to the invasion or withdrawing her
application. Consent, however, should be permitted only when
the privacy invasion is reasonable-that is, when the employer's
interest outweighs that of the applicant.28 Consent should thus
be legally enforceable only when justified by its own utility
analysis. 07
Even if one were to permit waivers of the right of privacy,
every court that has considered such waivers has required some
form of inquiry to assure that the waiver is legitimate.208 In other
areas of law, rules have evolved to test whether a waiver or
consent is clear and unmistakable,2°9 voluntary,210 knowing and
intelligent,21 1 and in writing.212
206. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
207. The California courts, for example, permit the conditioning of a constitutional
right only upon a showing that the utility of imposing the condition manifestly outweighs
the resulting impairment of constitutional rights, and that less intrusive alternatives are
unavailable. See Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 421 P.2d 409, 414-15 (Cal.
1966).
208. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983) (waiver of
statutorily protected rights).
210. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (consent to a police
search).
211. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver of right to counsel).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1985) (waiver of right
to jury trial pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). Different areas of
law have spawned different standards of greater and lesser difficulty. Even within criminal
law, entirely different tests apply to waiver of different rights. See generally William J.
Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REv. 761 (1989) (arguing that
the actual intended beneficiary of constitutional rights in the criminal context is not the
defendant but rather innocent third parties, and that varying waiver standards resulted
from the relative inability to separate these third party rights from the defendant's
rights). The differences between the standards do not appear to be based upon any
rational balance of the relative importance of the rights waived, but rather upon the
historical evolution of case law in each discrete area.
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In most instances, any waiver or consent to drug testing by
job applicants would meet none of the tests articulated in other
areas. Far from being clear and unmistakable, applicants gener-
ally do not even know that they are waiving rights. Frequently,
"6waivers" are not in writing. Even those that are in writing do
not generally refer to the California constitutional right of pri-
vacy, for example. Indeed, even when "consent" is in writing,
there is generally no indication that the applicants are waiving
their rights.
Nor could such waiver or consent be described as knowing and
intelligent. Many job applicants are not legally sophisticated.
They are often unaware of their legal rights. They know little
about urinalysis as far as what they will be required to do; what
monitoring they will be subject to; how their test results will be
reported, interpreted, and used; the extent to which confidenti-
ality will be assured; and so on.
Finally, for the reasons discussed above, the waiver may not
be truly voluntary because employers generally enjoy an enor-
mous bargaining advantage over applicants. That the applicants
may freely waive their right of privacy when the penalty for
refusal is the loss of a job is, at best, a legal fiction. 213
B. The Employer's Interest
The second category of argument supporting across-the-board
applicant drug testing-and the distinction between applicant
and employee drug testing-is the assertion that the employers'
interest in testing applicants is greater. This argument is unper-
suasive.
Initially, it must be noted that, in at least two respects,
employers do have a greater incentive to test applicants as
opposed to incumbent employees. As a practical matter, it is
very difficult for employers to obtain accurate information about
the personal habits and problems of job applicants. They may
213. A number of courts have concluded that loss of employment opportunities does
not constitute duress. See, e.g., Jevic v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 5 Individual Empl. Rts.
Cas. (BNA) 765, 772 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that job offer conditioned on drug test results
was not coercive); Stewart v. Pantry, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 (W.D. Kan. 1988)
(requiring employees to take polygraph does not constitute duress); Foley v. Polaroid
Corp., 508 N.E.2d 72, 77 (Mass. 1987) (holding that threat of discharge from employment
does not constitute false imprisonment). See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS S 18, at 121 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing consent given
under duress). Although this approach may be sound in a contractual or tort setting, it
simply does not make sense when dealing with a substantive right.
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obtain limited (and often unreliable) information about perform-
ance from a job reference, credit history, or driving record, but
such information is of little utility. By contrast, employers have
a relatively nonintrusive means of observing the problems of
incumbent employees in noncritical positions-they simply ob-
serve them. In addition, as discussed in Part II, the consequences
of hiring an applicant with a drug problem are potentially severe.
Many legal and financial benefits accrue to applicants immediately
upon hire.214
Neither of these arguments constitute a legally acceptable
justification for distinguishing applicant and employee testing.
First, the arguments are circular. They are based on the premise
that, because greater legal protections arise upon hiring, employ-
ers should have greater freedom to invade privacy before hiring.
That the courts and legislatures have chosen to provide greater
protections for employees may be a practical reason to perform
testing at the preemployment stage, but it will not suffice as a
policy rationale for the distinction.215
Second, the employers' primary interest in across-the-board
testing of all applicants is economic. Mere economic interests,
however, should not be sufficient to overcome the interests in
vindicating human dignity embodied in the right of privacy.
Indeed, almost without exception, Fourth Amendment cases con-
sidering drug testing have rejected purely economic justifications
for drug testing.216
Third, even with respect to economic interests, little empirical
evidence links the results of preemployment screening to job
performance. For example, a recent article in the Journal of the
American Medical Association noted that in light of the wide-
spread use of preemployment testing, "it is surprising that, to
214. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
215. Such logic sadly confirms the accuracy of Justice Black's prediction in Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), in which he stated that the "inevitable result" of the
requirement of hearings before government benefits may be terminated "will be that the
government will not put a claimant on the rolls initially until it has made an exhaustive
investigation to determine his eligibility." Id. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting). The result,
Justice Black suggested, would be that "many will never get on the rolls, or at least...
will remain destitute during the lengthy proceedings followed to determine initial eligi-
bility." Id.; see also TRIBE, supra note 35, at 690 n.37. As in Goldberg, to permit the
greater protections and benefits accorded employees to diminish the rights and protec-
tions of applicants may be a logical result, but it plainly is not one that the law should
sanction.
216. See, e.g., Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1192-93 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (purporting
to consider several noneconomic interests), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Willner v.
Barr, 60 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Sept. 12, 1991) (No. 91-448). But see id. at 1196 (Henderson,
J., dissenting) (claiming economic interests were actually the "sole interest on the
government's side of the scale").
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our knowledge, only one previous peer reviewed report has
addressed the efficacy of preemployment drug screening in pre-
dicting employment outcome."2' 17 Although the study did find
some relationship between drug use and injuries, accidents, and
absenteeism, the authors concluded that their findings "suggest
that many of the claims cited to justify preemployment drug
screening have been exaggerated. 218
Finally, the purported economic interests of employers are
undercut by the fact that most employers lack a coherent scheme
for detecting other potential problems in their applicant pool.
Few employers, for example, require applicants to undergo com-
plete physicals, which might reveal other conditions and problems
that could lead to accidents or absenteeism.2 9 Few screen for
alcohol, cigarette, or legal drug use. Many do not even check
references thoroughly. In addition, few employers who use drug
screening examine their equipment and work process for hazards
nearly as aggressively as they screen their employees for drug
use.
VII. CONCLUSION
Lurking beneath the entire applicant-testing controversy is a
motive for applicant testing that often goes either understated,
or completely unstated: screening job applicants and denying jobs
to drug users is an effective means of assisting in the "war on
drugs." The lack of consistency by employers in testing for other
potential applicant problems is telling evidence that assisting in
the "war on drugs" is the real agenda.
The Institute of Bill of Rights Law Task Force correctly
rejected this rationale as an acceptable basis for drug testing.
Labor law has long rejected the notion that the employer may
act as a policeman with respect to his work force. An employer
does not become, as a result of the employment relationship, the
"guardian of the employee's every personal action and does not
exercise parental control."22 Off-duty conduct is not a basis for
217. Craig Zwerling et al., The Eficacy of Preemployment Drug Screening for Marijuana
and Cocaine in Predicting Employment Outcome, 264 JAMA 2639, 2639 (1990).
218. Id. at 2643.
219. To some extent, of course, refusal to hire based on other physical conditions would
be prohibited by handicap and workers' compensation laws.
220. Janet Maleson Spencer, The Developing Notion of Employer Responsibility for the
Alcoholic, Drug-Addicted or Mentally Ill Employee: An Examination Under Federal and
State Employment Statutes and Arbitration Decisions, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 659, 686
(1979).
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employer discipline except when the conduct "'has an adverse
effect on the company's business or reputation, the morale and
well-being of other employees, or the employee's ability to per-
form his regular duties.' "m2
The government's attempt to encourage private employers to
use their workplaces to stop illegal drug use is truly a dangerous
precedent. Private sector employers have enormous power over
their employees-power not subject to constitutional con-
straints.2
Finally, from a policy perspective, depriving drug users of
employment is hardly the most effective social response to drug
abuse. No empirical study suggests that unemployment discour-
ages drug use or that employment encourages use. Common sense
and everyday experience suggests the contrary-that serious
drug use and addiction is more common among the unemployed.
Moreover, denying employment to drug users also denies users
medical insurance, employee assistance programs, and other re-
sources that may help overcome drug problems. Denying em-
ployment to drug users also puts more pressure on the very few
government programs that exist to help addicts. Indeed, by
encouraging preemployment drug screening, the government, at
a minimum, has eliminated two major attributes of employment
that may provide meaningful help in the war on drugs: the
financial resources of private industry and the positive psycho-
logical effect of employment.223
The right of privacy is a human constant that does not change
with the formal legal niceties of vested "property interests."
Distinctions between the privacy interests of applicants and em-
ployees are not supported by history, current laws in analogous
221. Id. at 709 (quoting In re Wheaton Indus., 64 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 826, 828 (1975)
(Kerrison, Arb.)); see also FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION
WoRKs 656-58 (4th ed. 1985) (discussing conduct away from the job as the basis for
discharge or discipline).
222. The government has aided and abetted the exploitation of this power through
such seemingly innocuous and toothless legislation as the Drug-Free Workplace Act, 41
U.S.C. SS 701-707 (1988). With this legislation the government attempted to evade the
Fourth Amendment by the simple artifice of encouraging but not mandating private
actors to serve as policemen. This may avoid the difficulties associated with state action
that would be triggered by mandatory testing-though a persuasive argument may also
be made that searches encouraged by the government do constitute state action.
223. Advocates of the choke hold theory might claim that applicant testing is most
effective in scaring away casual users rather than addicts. Presumably, nonaddicted drug
users will be deterred from drug use at least as long as necessary to pass a preemployment
screen. This short term deterrence is of little practical value, however, except as a test
of addiction.
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areas, or policy. On the contrary, the recognition of such distinc-
tions sets a very dangerous precedent, treating applicants fun-
damentally different from employees on matters in which their
interests and rights should be deemed the same, and embarking
on a path in which those without the "property" of existing
employment have fewer substantive protections than those with
such property.
